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Abstract
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for assigning stu-
dents to study places or fresh graduates to their first positions. In this paper we explore
the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning trainee teachers to
schools. Our model is motivated by the situation characteristic for Slovak and Czech
education system where each pre-service teacher specializes in two subjects. We show
that if the two subjects can be performed independently, then a feasible assignment
can be found efficiently by employing network flow techniques, while the requirement
to perform both subjects at the same school leads to intractable problems even under
several strict restrictions concerning the total number of subjects, partial capacities
of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list. Fi-
nally, we report on an integer programming model for solving the teachers assignment
problem and the results of its application to real data.
Keywords: assignment of students, bipartite matching, algorithm, NP-completeness
1 Introduction
The traditional study of teachers-to-be in Slovakia involves the specialization of each
student in two subjects, e.g. Mathematics and Physics, Chemistry and Biology, Slovak
language and English etc. In addition to the study of various topics of these subjects,
principles of Pedagogics and Psychology, each curriculum contains a practical placement
in a real school several times during the study. During each placement students visit
classes and also teach themselves, always under supervision of an experienced and qualified
teacher approved by the university for taking this responsibility. Students might try to
find suitable schools and supervising teachers by themselves, but to ensure the quality of
such a placement, each faculty usually provides a list of such schools and teachers, and
students are assigned to them by the faculty staff.
The assignment task is not easy and as the people responsible for practical placements
confirmed to the authors of this paper, it usually takes several days and many iterations
to assign each student. In an ideal case, everybody should be assigned to a school in the
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town where the university is located and use each placement run for a different type of
school (an upper elementary, practical secondary or a grammar school). However, even
if the number of approved supervising teachers is sufficient for the current number of
students to be placed, this is not always possible, as the structure of available places
might not be suitable, not all schools provide supervisors for all subjects, or they may not
have enough classes to accept several students for a particular subject. Hence some other
schools outside the site of the university could be used, but in this case it should be taken
into account that it may be infeasible for a student (for economic reasons) to commute to
a very distant school.
The aim of this paper is to model the trainee teachers matching problem and to
study its computational complexity. It turns out that if it is the case that during one
practical placement the student teaches one subject, and during another he/she teaches
the second subject (this is the way the practical placement are organized e.g. at Comenius
University in Bratislava or at Charles University in Prague) the matching problem can be
solved efficiently by emplyoing network flow techniques. However, other universities (e.g.
the one where the Slovak authors if this paper are affiliated) require that each student
teaches both subjects at one school during the same placement. For this case, we propose
efficient algorithms that find a matching for the maximum possible number of students
if there are altogether only two specialization subjects, or there are three subjects but
each school can accept at most one student for each subject (irrespectively of her other
specialization). Interestingly, if for each student at most two schools are acceptable and all
partial capacities are at most one, it is possible to decide whether a full assignment (i.e.,
one that matches all students) exists in polynomial time, but the problem of matching
the maximum number of students becomes intractable. The existence of full assignment
is also NP-complete if (i) there are only three subjects and schools may have capacity two
in one of its subjects, or if (ii) there are four subjects and each school has capacity at
most one in each subject. Moreover, this problem is also NP-complete if each school is
acceptable for each student, but now without the restriction on the number of subjects.
In the light of the intractability results presented in Section 4, in Section 5 we propose
an integer linear program for the teachers assignment problem and applied it to real data.
We report on the results of this trial in Section 6.
2 Related work
The classical problems of combinatorial optimization like the maximum cardinality bi-
partite matching problem, assignment problem, or flow problem have been successfully
applied to a range of variants of manpower allocation problems (see e.g. applications re-
viewed in [4], Chapter 12). Practical situations also lead to some NP-complete variants
[10].
Recently, a lot of attention has been attracted by several large-scale centralized allo-
cation schemes used for assigning pupils to public schools in Boston and New York [1, 2],
allocationg graduates of medical schools to their first jobs in hospitals in the USA [14],
university applicants to study places in Hungary [5] etc.
In such schemes, it is typically the case that the applicants rank in order of preference
the entities on the other side of the market (i.e., schools, hospitals or universities) that
they find acceptable. In addition, there may be preference lists over applicants belonging
to the members of the other side of the market. For an overview of other applications
and of various models involving ordinal preferences, together with their computational
complexity, the reader is advised to consult the recently published monograph by Manlove
[12] or the comprehensive web page containing a description of matching practices for
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various levels of education and for entry-level labour markets in many European countries.
When considering matching problems involving ordinal preferences, the model that
most closely resembles our problem is the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples [6].
This underpins the problem of assigning medical graduates to their first hospital posts
on the basis of two-sided preferences, when couples (i.e., pairs of applicants) are able
to submit joint preferences over pairs of hospitals, typically in order to be matched to
geographically close positions. A special case of this problem occurs when both members
of the couple refuse to be separated and insist on being allocated to the same hospital [13].
Another case is the Scottish scheme for medical students that have to be assigned to two
training units (medical and surgical one) and these two assignments have to be allocated
to two different semesters [11].
In our problem, the applicants do not have ordinal preferences over schools; they simply
list an acceptable set of schools and are effectively indifferent between them. Moreover, the
schools do not have preferences over applicants. An existing problem in the literature that
most closely resembles this case is called Matching with Couples [7], which is essentially
the same as the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples where agents are indifferent
between all members of their preference lists. However we emphasize that our model differs
from all of those discussed so far due to the applicants’ specialization in two subjects and
the schools being allowed to have different capacities for different subjects.
3 Definitions and preliminary observations
An instance J of the Teachers Assignment problem, tap for short, involves a set A of n
applicants (students, trainee teachers), a set S of m schools and a set P of k subjects.
For ease of exposition, elements of the set P will sometimes be referred to by letters like
M,F, I or B, to remind of real subjects taught at schools, like Mathematics, Physics,
Informatics or Biology etc.
Each applicant a ∈ A is characterized by a pair of different subjects p(a) = {p1(a),
p2(a)} ⊆ P . Sometimes we shall also say that a particular applicant is of type MF, MB,
or IB, etc. The set of applicants whose specialization involves a subject p ∈ P will be
denoted by Ap. We also suppose that each applicant a provides a list S(a) of acceptable
schools, i.e. schools to which he/she is willing to go.
Each school s ∈ S has a certain capacity for each subject, the vector of capacities of
school s will be c(s) = (c1(s), . . . , c|P |(s)) ∈ N|P |. An entry of c(s) will be referred to as
a partial capacity of school s. Here, cp(s) is the maximum number of applicants whose
specialization involves subject p that school s is able to accept. Again, we shall sometimes
write cM (s), cI(s) etc.
Let us first deal with the case when trainee teachers practice their two subjects sepa-
rately in two different periods (say first during one semester and then during the second
semester of an academic year). Now they can be assigned to two different schools and
the main challenge here is to decide the order of subjects for each trainee teacher so as
to be able to use the available capacities. For brevity, let us call a student-subject pair a
half-student.
Let us construct a network N = (V,E, c) where the set of vertices is V = {a, ap, aq; a ∈
A,p(a) = {p, q}, } ∪ {sp, s ∈ S, p ∈ P, cp(s) 6= 0} ∪ {r, t}. This means, there is a source
r, sink t, three vertices for each applicant: a simple one and two for each subject of
applicant’s specialization. For each school we have one vertex for each subject in which it
provides at least one place.
There is an arc ra for each a ∈ A with capacity c(ra) = 2 and two arcs aap, aaq with
capacity 1 for the two subjects p, q ∈ p(a). There is an arc with unit capacity from ap
3
to sp if school s is acceptable for applicant a. For each vertex sp we add an arc spt with
capacity c(spt) = 2cp(s).
Theorem 1 There is an integer flow f of size K in N if and only if it is possible to place
K half-students during an academic year.
Clearly, all students can be placed for their both subjects if and only if the size of the
maximum flow in N is 2n. As all the capacities in N are integer, the flow along each arc is
integral and its interpretation is clear: applicant a will perform her specialization subject
p at school s if and only if there is a unit flow along the arc apsp.
To divide the half-students into two periods, we use the following trick. Replace the
capacity c(e) of each arc e of N by dc(e)/2e and take the flow g(e) = f(e)/2. The halved
flow is no longer integer, but as the new capacities are, we use the following assertion,
known as Integrality lemma [15].
Lemma 2 (Integrality Lemma.) Let D = (V,E, c) be a network and f a flow of value
K ∈ Z. Then there exists an integer flow g of value K with bf(e)c ≤ g(e) ≤ df(e)e for
each arc e.
It is clear that at most one of the arcs e ∈ {aap, aaq} for each applicant has g(e) = 1.
Let us say that applicant a will practice her subject p in period one at school s such that
g(aap) = g(apsp) = 1 and subject q in period one at school s such that g(aap) = g(apsp) =
0 and simultaneously f(aap) = f(apsp) = 1.
By this, the case with separated subjects is completely solved and from now on we deal
only with the case when both subjects are practiced simultaneously at the same school.
An assignment M is a subset of A × S such that each applicant a ∈ A is a member
of at most one pair in M. We shall write M(a) = s if (a, s) ∈ M and say that applicant
a is assigned (to school s); if there is no such school, applicant a is unassigned. The set
of applicants assigned to a school s will be denoted by M(s) = {a ∈ A; (a, s) ∈ M}.
We shall also denote by Mp(s) the set of applicants assigned to s whose specialization
includes subject p and byMp,r(s) the set of applicants assigned to s whose specialization
is exactly the pair {p, r}. More preciselly,
Mp(s) = {a ∈ A; (a, s) ∈M & p ∈ p(a)}
and
Mp,r(s) = {a ∈ A; (a, s) ∈M & {p, r} = p(a)}.
An assignment M is feasible if M(a) ∈ S(a) for each a ∈ A and |Mp(s)| ≤ cp(s) for each
school s and each subject p.
Example. Suppose there are 3 subjects M,F and I and four applicants: a1 of type IF,
a2 of type MF and a3, a4 of type MI. There are two schools s1, s2 with cM (s1) = 1,
cF (s1) = cI(s1) = 2 and cM (s2) = 2, cF (s2) = cI(s2) = 1. Both schools are acceptable for
all applicants.
Here it is possible to assign all applicants, namelyM(a1) =M(a3) = s1 andM(a2) =
M(a4) = s2. However, suppose that applicant a1 is assigned to school s2. Then the three
applicants a2, a3 and a4 compete to the unique place in Mathematics at school s1, hence
at most one of them can be assigned.
This shows that there may exist maximal matchings (i.e., such that no additional ap-
plicant can be placed) with cardinality equal to half the cardinality of maximum matching.
max-tap denotes the problem to decide, given an instance J of tap and an integer
`, whether a feasible assignment exists that assignes at least ` applicants. A special case
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of max-tap asking for an assignment that leaves no student unassigned will be denoted
by full-tap. In the following section we explore the computational complexity of several
special cases of this problem.
4 Computational complexity
In this section we show that max-tap is easy in some very restricted cases (as far as the
number of subjects or the size of preference lists is concerned). Later we show that in
situations that usually occur in practice, the problem is intractable.
Theorem 3 max-tap is solvable in polynomial time in each of the following cases:
(i) |P | = 2;
(ii) |P | = 3 and no partial capacity of a school exceeds 1.
Proof. For (i) it suffices to realize that all applicants are essentially equivalent and a
school with partial capacities c1 and c2 can admit at most c = min{c1, c2} students.
Hence max-tap reduces to the classical bipartite b-matching problem that can be solved
in polynomial time by any well-known algorithm, see e.g. [4].
Similarly, in (ii) each school can admit at most one applicant, so max-tap is reduced to
the simple maximum cardinality bipartite matching problem, again solvable in polynomial
time.
In the following two assertions let us denote by tap(α, β) the set of instances of tap
in which each applicant is allowed to list at most α acceptable schools and all partial
capacities are at most β. Hence full-tap(α, β) and max-tap(α, β) denote the problems
defined above restricted to instances in tap(α, β).
Theorem 4 full-tap(2, 1) is solvable in polynomial time for |P | arbitrary.
Proof. Let us proceed in the following way. In the first phase we deal with applicants
that list a school that does not have enough capacity for both specialization subjects.
Such schools can be removed from their lists. If we get some applicants with empty lists,
then the particular instance of full-tap is clearly insolvable. Otherwise, if the list of
an applicant contains only one school (let us call these applicants spoiled), to get a full
assignment, he/she must be assigned to that particular school. This, however, decreases
the respective partial capacities of the school involved and new spoiled applicants can
emerge. If, in this first phase we are not able to place all spoiled applicants, no full
matching exists; otherwise we continue with the second phase with the partial capacities
reduced accordingly. (It is easy to see that the first phase can be performed in polynomial
time.)
The obtained cannonical full-tap instance J has |S(a)| = 2 for each a ∈ A. Let us
denote S(ai) = {s1i , s2i } and introduce a boolean variable xi for each applicant ai with the
following interpretation: if xi is TRUE, we shall say that ai is assigned to school s
1
i ; if xi
is FALSE, we say that ai is assigned to school s
2
i . Now create a boolean formula B(J)
in the following way. For each pair of applicants ai, aj whose specialization involves at
least one common subject and for each school s ∈ S(ai) ∩ S(aj) we create a clause Ci,j,s
as follows:
• if s = s1i and s = s1j then Ci,j,s = x¯i + x¯j ;
• if s = s1i and s = s2j then Ci,j,s = x¯i + xj ;
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• if s = s2i and s = s1j then Ci,j,s = xi + x¯j ;
• if s = s2i and s = s2j then Ci,j,s = xi + xj .
Clause Ci,j,s ensures that ai and aj do not both occupy the only place for their common
subject at school s. Formula B(J) is then the conjuction of clauses Ci,j,s for all triples
ai, aj , s as described above. It is easy to see that B(J) is satisfiable if and only if a full
assignment for J exists (remember, we assume that J is cannonical). B(J) is a boolean
formula in conjunctive normal form and since each clause contains just two literals, its
satisfiability can be decided in polynomial time. This concludes that full-tap(2,1) is
polynomially solvable.
By contrast, maximizing the number of assigned applicants is difficult.
Theorem 5 max-tap(2, 1) is NP-complete.
Proof. max-tap(2, 1) clearly belongs to NP. To prove completeness, we give a polynomial
reduction from the 3-coloring problem restricted to graphs G with maximum degree ∆(G)
bounded by 4 (see [9], problem GT4).
So let us assume that G = (V,E) is a simple graph with ∆(G) ≤ 4. For G we construct
in polynomial time an instance J of tap(2, 1) and an integer ` in such a way that G admits
a proper vertex coloring by three colors (let us denote them by r, w and b, i.e., red, white
and blue) if and only if J admits a feasible assignment assigning at least ` applicants.
By Vizing’s theorem, the edges of G can be colored by five colors, let c : E →
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} denote a proper coloring of E, i.e., such that no two edges incident to the
same vertex have the same color. This coloring will be used in our construction.
There are 38 subjects in J : two subjects p(c, x, 1) and p(c, x, 2) for each (edge color, ver-
tex color) pair (c, x) (altogether 30 subjects) plus 8 subjects p1, p2, p1x, p
2
x for x ∈ {r, w, b}
(vertex subjects).
There is one school sv for each vertex v ∈ V . School sv provides one place for each
vertex subject and one place for each subject p(c, x, j), where x ∈ {r, w, b}, j = 1, 2 and c
are colors of edges incident to v. This means, there are altogether 8|V |+∑v∈V 3·2·deg(v) =
8|V |+ 12|E| places at schools, capable of admitting ` = 4|V |+ 6|E| applicants.
For each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E define three applicants: a(e, r), a(e, w) and a(e, b) and
call them the red, white and blue applicant of edge e, respectively. Their subjects are
p(c(e), j, 1) and p(c(e), x, 2) where c(e) is the color of edge e and x is the color of the
applicant, i.e., either red, white or blue. The acceptable schools of these three applicants
are just sv and su.
To define further applicants, let us consider for each vertex v ∈ V an auxiliary graph
Gv, illustrated in Figure 1.
Suppose that v is incident with edges e1, e2, . . . , et, where t ≤ 4. Gv consists of three
edge-disjoint paths, each corresponding to one of the vertex colors r, w, b. Vertices of
Gv represent subjects offered at school sv, the subjects along one path corresponding to
x ∈ {r, w, b} are in this order
p1, p1x, p(c(e1), x, 1), p(c(e1), x, 2), p(c(e2), x, 1), p(c(e2), x, 2),
. . . , p(c(et), x, 1), p(c(et), x, 2), p
2
x, p2.
In Figure 1, thick edges correspond to already defined edge applicants. Notice that these
applicants appear also in graphs Gu for each u adjacent to v. All the other edges in
Gv define new applicants (by the corresponding pair of subjects) called vertex applicants
whose the only acceptable school is sv. Hence in J we have 3|E| edge applicants and
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Figure 1: Auxiliary graph
3(2deg(v) + 3) vertex applicants for each vertex v ∈ V , hence altogether 9|V | + 15|E|
applicants.
Notice that since we used a proper edge coloring of G, no two subjects defined for
vertices of Gv are the same. Further, Gv has exactly three perfect matchings: Mr, Mw
and Mb, where Mx, x ∈ {r, w, b} matches all the edge students corresponding to all edges
incident to v of color x (they are on one of the paths) and all vertex students on the other
two paths. Each perfect matching of Gv defines an assignment of applicants that occupy
all places offered by school sv.
Now suppose that G admits a proper coloring of its vertices by three colors. For each
v ∈ V , let us choose in Gv matching Mr, Mw or Mb, according to whether v is colored
by red, white or blue. As two adjacent vertices received a different color, this is a feasible
matching assigning ` = 4|V |+ 6|E| applicants.
Conversely, let J admit a matching that assigns k = 4|V | + 6|E| applicants. Such an
assignment has to fill all the places at each school, hence the applicants assigned to school
sv must correspond to a perfect matching in Gv, for each v ∈ V . Let us color vertex v by
one of the colors red, white or blue, if Gv is matched according to Mr, Mw or Mb. Now
consider two vertices v and u joined by edge e and suppose that they are colored by the
same color (say red). However, by the definition of the coloring, the red applicant a(e, r)
corresponding to edge e is assigned to sv as well as to su, a contradiction.
Let us also remark here that the previous theorem implies that the problem to decide
whether there exists a feasible assignment using all the available places at schools is also
NP-complete.
The starting known NP-complete problem for the following theorem is 3-dimensional
matching, 3DM in brief ([9], problem SP1). An instance of 3DM contains three disjoint
sets U, V and W , all of cardinality n, and a set of triples T ⊆ U ×V ×W . The question is
whether there exists a perfect matching, i.e. a subset N ⊆ T of cardinality n that covers
all elements of U ∪ V ∪W . We shall use the NP-complete restriction of 3DM to such
instances where no element occurs in more than 3 triples in T .
Theorem 6 full-tap is NP-complete already when |S(a)| ≤ 3 and
(i) |P | = 3 and no partial capacity of a school exceeds 2; or
(ii) |P | = 4 and no partial capacity of a school exceeds 1.
Proof. For case (i), given an instance J = (U, V,W, T ) of 3DM, we construct an instance
J ′ of tap with 3 subjects (say M,F and I) and cM (s) = 2, cF (s) = cI(s) = 1 for each
school.
For each triple t ∈ T we create a school st. For each z ∈ U ∪ V ∪W let Tz be the
set of triples in T containing z and `z = |Tz|. For each u ∈ U we create applicants
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a1u, a
2
u, . . . , a
`u−1
u , each of type IF; their set will be denoted by Au. For each v ∈ V we
create an applicant av of type MI and for each w ∈ W an applicant aw of type MF. For
each applicant corresponding to an element z ∈ U ∪ V ∪W , acceptable schools are those
that correspond to triples in Tz.
Suppose that the 3DM instance J has a perfect matching N ⊆ T . We assign each
applicant in J ′ to an acceptable school so that the capacity of no school in no subject will
be exceeded.
For each t = (u, v, w) ∈ N we assign to school st applicants av and aw. For each
u ∈ U there are `u − 1 triples t ∈ T \N containing u, so to the corresponding schools we
assign applicants a1u, a
2
u, . . . , a
`u−1
u . It is easy to see that each applicant is assigned to an
acceptable school and that the defined assignment obeys all capacities.
Conversely suppose that there exists a full feasible assignment M. Let SN be the
set of schools to which two applicants are assigned in M and let N ⊆ T be the set of
corresponding triples. By the construction, if st ∈ SN and t = (u, v, w) then the assigned
applicants are av and aw. Clearly, for two different schools in SN these two applicants are
different and so also any two different triples in N differ in their elements from V and W .
It remains to show that if t, t′ ∈ N are different then their corresponding elements from
U are also different.
To get a contradiction, suppose that some element u ∈ U belongs to at least two
different triples t, t′ ∈ N . Notice that the only acceptable schools for `u − 1 applicants of
the set Au are the `u schools st for t ∈ Tu. If two different schools st, st′ belong to SN
then the number of schools that have enough capacity for `u− 1 applicants in Au and are
acceptable for them is at most `u − 2. This is a contradiction with the assumption that
M is a full assignment.
The proof for (i) can easily be modified for (ii) by making the following changes:
• The set of subjects is M,F,I,B,
• each school s has cM (s) = cF (s) = cI(s) = cB(s) = 1;
• for each v ∈ V the type of applicant av is MF;
• for each w ∈W the type of applicant av is IB;
• for each u ∈ U contained in `u triples in T there are `u − 1 applicants of type MI
and `u − 1 applicants of type FB.
The acceptability is defined in the same way according to the structure of T and the rest
of the proof is analogical.
The last assertion in this section concerns the case when each school is acceptable for
each applicant (e.g. if each school is in the town where the university is located). However,
we need a great number of subjects and the computational complexity of the problem with
bounded number of subjects remains open.
Theorem 7 max-tap is NP-complete, even in the case when each school is acceptable
for each applicant and no partial capacity exceeds 2.
Proof. We reduce from a restricted version of SAT. Let (2,2)-E3-SAT denote the problem
of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3
literals and for each variable vj , each of literals vj and v¯j appears exactly twice in B,
whether B is satisfiable. Berman et al. showed that (2,2)-E3-SAT is NP-complete.
Hence let B be an instance of (2,2)-E3-SAT. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Let us denote the
indices of the two clauses that contain literal vj by c(v
1
j ) and c(v
2
j ), and the indices of the
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two clauses that contain literal v¯j by c(v¯
1
j ) and c(v¯
2
j ), respectively. For each clause ci, the
symbols v1(ci), v
2(ci) and v
3(ci) denote the indices of the variables (negated or not) that
appear in the first, second and third position in ci, respectively.
Now we construct an instance J of tap in the following way.
For each variable vj , j = 1, 2, . . . , n there are 3 subjects xj , y
1
j , y
2
j and two schools
sTj , s
F
j . For an easy reference, they will be called the variable subjects and variable schools.
For each clause ci, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, there is one subject pˆi and one school sˆi. Hence there
are altogether 3n+m subjects and 2n+m schools. Each partial capacity at each school is
at most 2. Table 1 gives for each school the list of subjects with capacity 1 and the (only)
subject with capacity 2.
There is one a-applicants for each literal and three b-applicants for each variable. The
types of applicants are given in Table 2.
school subjects with capacity 1 subject with capacity 2
sTj y
1
j , y
2
j , pˆc(v1j )
, pˆc(v2j )
xj
sFj y
1
j , y
2
j , pˆc(v¯1j )
, pˆc(v¯2j )
xj
sˆi xv1(ci), xv2(ci), xv3(ci) pˆi
Table 1: The subjects with capacities 1 and 2 at schools
applicant subject 1 subject 2 applicant subject 1 subject 2
a(v1j ) xj pˆc(v1j )
bj y
1
j y
2
j
a(v2j ) xj pˆc(v2j )
bˆ1j xj y
1
j
a(v¯1j ) xj pˆc(v¯1j )
bˆ2j xj y
2
j
a(v¯2j ) xj pˆc(v¯2j )
Table 2: Types of applicants
Due to the definitions of subjects it is clear that the a-applicants can only be assigned
to schools that correspond either to the variable or to the clause that contains the corre-
sponding literal and the b-applicants related to a variable can only be assigned to schools
that correspond to this variable.
For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let us denote
Tj = {(bj , sTj ), (bˆ1j , sFj ), (bˆ2j , sFj )}, Fj = {(bj , sFj ), (bˆ1j , sTj ), (bˆ2j , sTj )}.
Now let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B, we shall define a full assignment M
as follows. If variable vj is true, add the pairs in Tj to M, if vj is false, add the pairs in
Fj toM. Applicants of type a corresponding to true literals of variable vj are assigned to
school sTj , those that correspond to false literals of variable vj are assigned to the school
that corresponds to the clause containing the literal in question. As each clause contains
at most two false literals, it is easy to check that each applicant is assigned to a school
offering both her subjects and that no partial capacity is exceeded.
Conversely, letM be a full feasible assignment for J . Then, for each j, the b-applicants
are assigned according to Tj or Fj . Let us call the former case the T case and the latter
the F case. Define the truth assignment f by setting variable vj to be true in the T case
and false in the F case.
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Now take clause ci. As the capacity of subject pˆi at school sˆi is two, at most two
a-applicants who listed school sˆi can be assigned to sˆi. So at least one applicant corre-
sponding to a literal contained in ci, say a literal of variable vj , has to be assigned to
school sTj or s
F
j , according to whether this literal is vj or v¯j . Now it is easy to see that in
accordance with the definition of f , this must be a true literal. Hence B is satisfied by f .
5 Integer linear program for tap
Taking into account the intractability results of the previous section, we now turn our
attention to integer linear programming. In this section we present an integer linear
programming model for solving the max-tap problem. This formulation allows also for
some special features that were encountered in the real data. First, we allow that some
applicants need a placement for one subject only. This situation occurs if an applicant
has received recognition for one of their subjects for some other activity (e.g. teaching
the subject in question in a specialized summer camp, working in a councelling centre,
etc.) or if the applicant has failed an exam that is a prerequisite for a particular subject
and cannot therefore study that subject before resitting and passing the exam at a later
date. We shall also provide a special treatment for cases where students specializing in
one subject are allowed to do their practical placement in another (related) subject. This
is the case for students of Psychology. Since there are an insufficient number of posts to
allocate all of the students who wish to study Psychology these students may be allocated
to either Ethics or Civics courses instead.
Let J be an instance of tap with applicants A = {a1, . . . , an}, schools S = {s1 . . . , sm}
and subjects P = {p1, . . . , pk}. Let us associate with each applicant ai ∈ A a vector
vi of length k such that vip = 1 if the specialization of ai involves subject p and v
i
p = 0
otherwise. Thus vip = 1 for at most two values of p, for a given i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Further, each
applicant ai has an ordered list of length `(ai) consisting of acceptable schools s ∈ S(ai).
Let pos(ai, r) denote the school at position r in the ordered list of applicant ai, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ r ≤ `(ai).
The set of variables will be X = {xi,r; 1 ≤ i ≤ n; 1 ≤ r ≤ `(ai) + 1} with the following
interpretation:
xi,r =
{
1 if ai is matched to the school in position r
th in his list
0 otherwise
for r = 1, 2, . . . , `(a)i, and
xi,`(ai)+1 =
{
1 if ai is unmatched
0 otherwise.
Let us consider the following linear program
n∑
i=1
`(ai)∑
r=1
xi,r → max (1)
`(ai)+1∑
r=1
xi,r = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n (2)
n∑
i=1
`(ai)∑
r=1
{xi,r; pos(ai, r) = sj ; vip = 1} ≤ cp(sj) for j = 1, . . . ,m, p = 1, . . . , k (3)
xi,r ∈ {0, 1} (4)
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Constraints (2) ensure that each applicant is matched to exactly one school or is
unmatched. Constraints (3) express that the number of applicants assigned to school sj
whose specialization involves subject p does not exceed the partial capacity of subject p
at school sj . The following assertion is obvious.
Theorem 8 The optimal solution of (1)–(4) corresponds to a solution of max-tap.
Let us now describe how to handle the possibility that there are an unsufficient number
of places for applicants whose specialization involves a certain subject (for simplicity, let us
suppose that the index of this subject is 1), but it is acceptable to assign these applicants
to places of some related subjects (here, again for ease of exposition, let us suppose that
these related subjects are indexed by 2 and 3). First, let us denote the set of applicants
ai such that v
i
1 = 1 and v
i
2 = v
i
3 = 0 by A
′. For each ai ∈ A′ we creat two clones ai+n and
ai+2n, such that
vi+n1 = 0; v
i+n
2 = 1; v
i+n
3 = 0;
vi+2n1 = 0; v
i+2n
2 = 0; v
i+2n
3 = 1;
vi+nj = v
i+2n
j = v
i
j for each j > 3.
The lists of schools both clones of ai are the same as that of ai. The constraints which
are applied to ai are applied in similar fashion to ai+n and ai+2n.
Since we require that at most one of the three clones be matched, the unmatched
position `(ai) + 1 may be 0 for at most one of the three clones. Thus the sum across the
3 unmatched positions must be greater than or equal to 2. Thus ILP (1)–(4) we add for
each ’cloned’ applicant the following constraint
xi,`(ai)+1 + xi+n,`(ai+n)+1 + xi+2n,`(ai+2n)+1/geq2.
The clone that is actually matched determines which subject will applicant ai teach (either
subject 1, or subject 2 or subject 3).
6 Description of data
The teachers study at the Faculty of Science, P.J. Sˇafa´rik University, Kosˇice, started in
1953. Originally, only four subjects were offered: Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and
Biology. These were joined in 2002 by Informatics and Geography. In reaction to strictly
decreasing numbers of student, the Faculty of Science decided to join forces with the newly
created Philosophical Faculty (2007) and offer joined study programmes. Currently the
number of subjects offered by the Faculty of Science is 6, Philosophical Faculty offers
8 subjects. Practically any combination of two subjects is possible, in our dataset we
encountered 33 different pairs of subjects.
In the current academic year there are approximately 500 students studying teachers
combinations at both faculties. In one run, between 100 and 150 of them have to be
placed. There are 175 schools. The numbers of supervising teachers for various subjects
and the numbers of students who applied for the placement in the Spring 2014 run whose
specialization contains a given subject are given in Table 3. Recall that when the time
comes, some of these students will not participate in the placement or will be allowed to
teach only one of their specialization subjects (e.g. if they fail at some prerequisite subjects
at the end of the winter semester). Our model is capable of taking this into account.
When looking at Table 3, it seems that the numbers of supervising teachers is suffi-
cient, except for Psychology. The common practice is to assign students of Psychology
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Kosˇice 74 36 50 38 44 31 54 57 35 0 24 2 16 23
Total 288 158 172 142 137 127 243 216 129 3 119 12 80 135
Applicants 13 9 43 21 4 35 31 14 22 1 21 22 12 28
Table 3: Numbers of supervising teachers and applicants for individual subjects
to supervising teachers of Civics or Ethics, as described in the previous section. Then
the total number of teachers of these three subjects is sufficient for the total number of
students whose specialization involves the three subjects.
With these assumptions, our ILP model found that out of 138 students, the maximum
number that could be placed to schools in Kosˇice was 122. When we included also rural
schools, this number increased to 137. It was easy to identify the only student who could
not be placed: his specialization involved Latin and there was no Latin teacher in a school
acceptable for this student. The time needed for the computations was in both cases less
than one second.
7 Conclusions and open problems
In the quest for a possible centralized matching scheme the presented intractability results
are pessimistic. Still, integer programming formulation proved to be very effective for
solving the given problem in a practical context.
The existing extensive literature on matchings and many succesfull existing schemes
call for exploring other possible approaches. Students, in addition to expressing accept-
ability, could be allowed to list the acceptable schools in order of their preference and/or
the schools might also be given the right to order students. Then some other criteria
for the obtained matching might be considered: Pareto optimality (from the viewpoint of
students, see [3]) or stability (introduced by Gale and Shapley [8]).
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